

Notes on Full Interpretation

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I. *there*

1. Expletive *there* (cf. Kayne 2006b)

(1) Proposal: *There* is not a true expletive. Rather, it originates within the so-called 'associate', in way that has something in common with Moro (1997) and, more so, with Sabel (2000), though expletive *there* is more closely tied to various other instances of *there* than in these earlier works.

2. *There* as deictic.

As a first step, it is necessary to move away from thinking of the *there* of sentences like *We went there* as 'locative', which is misleading in an important respect, given:

(2) We spoke thereof.

which contains what seems to be a locative *there* in sentences that do not involve location. The account I proposed in Kayne 2004a goes essentially as follows.

There is not, strictly speaking, locative in any of its uses. Both in (2) and in banal locative sentences like:

(3) We went there yesterday.

we have an element *there* that is the same element as the one found in non-standard English in:

(4) That there car ain't no good.

In both (3) and (4) *there* modifies a noun, except that in (3) the noun is silent, i.e. (3) is to be thought of as:

(5) ...there PLACE...

The same holds of (2), except that the silent noun in (2) is not PLACE, but THING:

(6) ...there THING of...

The question now is how to understand the *there* that occurs in this range of environments. In (2), it is not locative in any simple sense. The link with (4) suggests a link with what we call demonstratives, which in some cases do seem related to location, as in pointing contexts:

(7) Bring us that book, please.

Yet, as is well-known, demonstratives are not limited to contexts involving location:

(8) That book you mentioned yesterday is of little interest.

A familiar idea concerning demonstratives is that they involve deixis, or reference to or orientation with respect to the speaker. The difference between *this* and *that* in English could be put as 'in the sphere of the source of the sentence' vs. 'not in the sphere of the source of the sentence'.

Taking the term 'deixis' over to *there* (and *here*), I will henceforth speak of deictic *there* (and deictic *here*), for all the cases mentioned. In each of (2), (3) and (4) we have an instance of

exactly the same deictic *there*; the three differ with respect to what deictic *there* modifies (THING in (2), PLACE in (3), and *car* in (4)). For the case of deictic *there* modifying PLACE, a noun expressing location, I will use the term 'locative *there*', to be understood solely as an abbreviation for 'deictic *there* modifying PLACE'.

From this perspective, all of (2)-(4) contain deictic *there*. But of the three sentences, only (3) is a locative sentence (in the sense that it contains locative *there*, by virtue of containing '*there* PLACE').

3. Expletive *there* as deictic.

What exactly do we mean by 'expletive' here? One of the guiding principles of the discussion so far has been that the various uses of *there* are all reflections of exactly the same deictic element occurring in somewhat different environments. In all the cases discussed, the deictic modified a noun (or NP). That noun is overt in *that there car*. In the other cases mentioned, the noun modified by the deictic is silent, either PLACE or THING. Pursuing this guiding principle further, we unavoidably (and desirably, I will argue) arrive at the conclusion that all the expletive uses of *there* are likewise instances of this same deictic element.

If English expletive *there* is the same deictic element as all the other instances of *there*, then we would expect it, too, to modify a noun (or NP). The next question, then, is, what noun? Taking into account examples like:

(9) There's a car in this garage.

and the fact that *there* is incompatible with *this*:

(10) There's a car in this here/*there garage.

there is little plausibility to taking *there* in these examples to modify *garage*. Much more natural, I think, is the proposal that expletive *there* is modifying the other noun, the one informally called the 'associate'. Put another way, in (9) and (10) expletive *there* is a deictic modifier of *car*.

More generally:

(11) In English existential sentences, expletive *there* is invariably a deictic modifier of the associate.

(Note that given the discussion above, this definitely does not mean that expletive *there* is locative; expletive *there* (and its counterparts in other languages) is a deictic element that is non-locative, i.e. that does not modify PLACE.)

Adopting (11) means adopting derivations in which expletive *there* originates within the associate and splits off from it, ending up in subject position. There are two ways to think of this splitting off. One would be to have *there* raise directly out of the associate containing it. A second would be to have the rest of the associate raise, stranding *there* and then to have '*there* + trace of associate' raise further in the manner of remnant movement.

There may well be some questions with respect to which the choice between these two approaches to 'splitting' is neutral. For others, though, the choice is likely to be meaningful (e.g., for agreement, as discussed below). Thinking more specifically of the kind of remnant movement derivations discussed in Kayne 2002a and works cited there, and of the possible impossibility of extraction of modifiers from within a containing DP, let me adopt the second, remnant movement, approach, which yields (partial, sketchily illustrated) derivations such as the following:

(12) ...[there a book]... --> raising of 'a book'
 ...a book_i ... [there t_i]... --> merger of V

...is a book_i ... [there t_j]... --> remnant movement

...[there t_j] is a book_i ... t_j...

The proposal reflected in (12) has expletive *there* originating as an instance of deictic (non-locative) *there* contained within an indefinite DP (using the term DP loosely). In (non-standard) English, however, *there* appears with an overt noun only in the presence of a demonstrative:

(13) that there book; this here book

as opposed to:

(14) *the there book; *the here book

(15) *a there book; *some here book, etc.

(16) *there a book; *here some book, etc.

How plausible is it, then, in particular in light of (15) and (16), to allow the derivation in (12)?

One consideration can be put as follows. Given (13), would we have expected (15) or (16) to be acceptable, or not? That depends, I think, on how exactly we see the derivation of (13) itself. In particular, if (13) has *there* or *here* originating within a relative clause structure, then it is the impossibility of (15)/(16) that is actually a bit surprising, given that relative clauses are in general compatible with both definite and indefinite 'heads'.

Kayne (2004a) argued against a relative clause analysis of (13) on what I now think were inconclusive grounds. The relevant data are in part:

(17) *that over there book, *this right here book

which contrast with:

(18) the book that's over there; the book that's right here

Relatives can contain *over there* or *right here*, but those combinations are not possible prenominally. Somewhat similarly, *there* in a relative can be stressed in a way that it cannot be prenominally:

(19) the book that's THERE

(20) *that THERE book

(vs. that GREEN book) - suggesting, apparently, that prenominal deictic *there* and *here* must have a source other than within a (reduced) relative. However, there's a narrower conclusion that can be drawn - one that allows these facts to be interpreted as neutral with respect to the relative clause question.

This narrower conclusion is that *over* and *right* in (17) and stress in (20) are excluded because they all depend on the presence of PLACE. Deictic *there* and *here* are by themselves not compatible with *over* or *right* or with contrastive stress falling on them. If this is correct, then prenominal deictic *there* (or *here*) could well have a relative clause source, as long as the relative lacked PLACE.

If prenominal *there* and *here* do have a relative clause source, then it is (15)/(16) that is surprising, and not the presence of '[there a book]' in the derivation proposed in (12).

The question remains, then, as to why neither (15) nor (16) is possible. Let me suggest a link to Szabolcsi's (1983; 1994) analysis of Hungarian possessive sentences. Szabolcsi argues that possessors (in the Hungarian counterparts of simple possessive sentences like *John has a sister*) originate within a DP (containing *a sister*) that is the argument of an existential verb (that looks like *be*). The possessor then moves out of that DP, doing so optionally when the DP is definite, obligatorily when the DP is indefinite.

Putting it slightly differently, a Hungarian DP containing a (relatively non-embedded) possessor must necessarily 'split' if that DP is indefinite (and may do so if it is definite). Let me now suggest the same for deictic *there*, namely that when deictic *there* is contained in an

indefinite DP (and not embedded too far down in it), that indefinite DP must split obligatorily, in the way shown in (12). (Why exactly such (non-specific) indefinites must split in these two kinds of cases, and perhaps others, or perhaps all cases, remains to be elucidated.) (15) and (16) are impossible as intact DPs because they have not split, despite being indefinite. Yet such indefinite DPs containing deictic *there* (or *here*) can be legitimate if they do split, and therefore can appear in the initial stage of a derivation such as (12).

In summary, then, what we call expletive *there* is characterized by (11) and has a derivation of the sort loosely sketched in (12).

4. Deictics, demonstratives and indefinites.

As illustrated in (13)-(16), English deictics have a privileged relation to demonstratives, which are the only determiners that in (non-standard) English can overtly cooccur with a pronominal deictic. On the other hand, not every instance of a demonstrative is compatible with a deictic, even (to my not entirely native ear) in non-standard English. The following seem appreciably less possible than (13):

(21) *Your child has never been that there irritable before.

(22) *A thesis shouldn't really be this here short.

(Both of these would be possible without *there* or *here*.) The generalization may be that deictics must modify a noun (or projection thereof).

To the (partial) extent that deictics do have a privileged relation with demonstratives, we are led to ask, given the proposal that deictics can in fact combine with indefinites, whether demonstratives might not be able to combine with indefinites, too, in a way that would support separating both deictics and demonstratives from any intrinsic link to definiteness.

Of interest here is Hebrew, as discussed by Sichel 2001, which has the convenient property that its demonstratives cooccur, when in a definite DP, with an overt definite article:

(23) ha-yalda ha-zot ('the girl the dem.')

Yet Hebrew also allows (Sichel, chap. 1, note 6):

(24) yalda zot

with no definite article, yet with the same demonstrative element. In addition, while (23) as a direct object would be preceded by the morpheme *et* that normally precedes definite direct objects, (24) would not be. Sichel concludes that (24) is an instance of a demonstrative that is not definite.

It seems, then, that demonstratives are no more universally wedded to definites than are, given my proposal that expletive *there* is a deictic originating within an indefinite, deictics. The plausibility of (12) is thereby enhanced.

5. The definiteness effect.

The order of elements in the constituent '[there a book]' postulated in (12), in which *there* precedes *a*, is indirectly supported by (non-standard):

(25) these here four books

to the extent that the indefinite article *a* is akin to numerals, as argued by Perlmutter (1970). In other words, '...there a...' in (12) parallels '...here four...' in (25).

Assume now that the definite article would, in contrast, precede the deictic, as the demonstrative does. This means that replacing the indefinite article in (12) by a definite article would yield:

(26) ...[the there book]...

(27) ...[the there three books]...

This contrast in relative position between definite and indefinite article will have an interesting effect. Whereas in (12) 'a book' could raise out from within 'there a book', that same raising will be precluded in (26) or (27). Such raising of 'the book' or of 'the three books' out of their containing DP is precluded by the fact that in (26) and (27) 'the book' and 'the three books' are not constituents. Therefore there is no way to have, parallel to (12), a derivation that would yield, with expletive *there*:

(28) *There's the book on the table.

Thus we have, granted that *the* must precede *there* or *here*, the beginning of an account of the core definiteness effect found in (English) existentials.

In essence, any determiner that must in general precede deictic *there* will be incompatible with the kind of derivation shown in (12) that underlies existentials that contain expletive *there* (a particular subcase of deictic *there*).

Starting from (26) or (27) there is another imaginable derivation that needs to be considered, in which '(a) book' or 'three books' would be raised out of the containing DP leaving behind 'the there'. Such a derivation would yield:

(29) *The there is (a) book on the table.

(30) *The there are three books on the table.

These can be excluded if the presence of *the* blocks the raising operation. That *the* might have such a blocking effect is a long-standing idea - cf. Fiengo and Higginbotham (1981). Although there are exceptions and although the reason for the blocking effect needs to be made more precise, there is one very sharp case in Romance that seems to fit well with (29)/(30):

(31) Jean en a (*les) trois. ('J of-them has (the) three')

(32) Jean en a un/*l' autre. ('J of-them has an/the other')

In these French examples, the extraction of quantitative *en* (cf. Pollock (1998)) is blocked by the presence of a definite article.

Thinking of (25) and the corresponding non-standard:

(33) them there four books

(with *them* rather than *those*), one also needs to exclude a derivation that would yield:

(34) *Them there were four books on the table an hour ago.

Again, it is plausible that the presence of *them* blocks the extraction of *four books* that would have been necessary to derive (34) in a way parallel to the licit derivation indicated in (12).

Arguably like the definiteness effect of (28) is (cf. Heim (1987)) the absence of a wide scope reading for *three books* in:

(35) There must be three books on the table.

From the present perspective, a wide scope ('specific') reading of *three books* must in general require the presence of a 'specific' D (a more general D than the one restricted to definites), covert in English but arguably overt in Gungbe - Aboh (2004, chap. 3). That D will have the same effect on extraction of *there* as the definite D, assuming that it would have to precede deictic *there*, just as definite D does. (Not surprisingly, then, Cresti (2003) argues that there is a parallel scope restriction with Italian *ne* (related to the French *en* of (31) and (32)).)

6. Agreement.

In the remnant movement derivation given in (12), what ends up in subject position is '[there t_i]', where t_i is the trace/copy of 'a book'. In the corresponding derivation of:

(36) There are three books on the table.

what ends up in subject position is again '[there t_i]', where t_i is now the trace/copy of 'three books'. This may make it possible to take the plural *are* in (36) to be determined by the plurality of the phrase in subject position, which is not simply expletive (deictic) *there*, but a bigger phrase containing (the trace/copy of) plural number - cf. also Koopman (2003; 2005). If this is correct, then there may be no need here for downward agreement of the sort proposed by Chomsky (2001).

A property of English agreement mentioned by Chomsky is:

(37) ?There are only us.

(38) There's/*am me.

It may be that these, like other cases with definites, involve extra structure, e.g. something like 'There's someone, namely me', so that the agreement in these examples is really with the containing indefinite DP.

7. Why is *there* the expletive?

English expletive *there* has no counterpart in *then*:

(39) There are problems with your proposal.

(40) *Then are problems with your proposal.

If expletives were uninterpretable elements merged directly into a (relatively) high subject position, it would not be immediately clear why English or some nearby (or distant) language could not have *then* as its expletive. From the present perspective, which takes expletive *there* to be a deictic element merged within an indefinite DP, we can do somewhat better. First, we can note that the contrast between (39) and (40) is not limited to existential contexts; it is also found in the archaic English construction mentioned earlier, e.g.:

(41) We spoke thereof/*thenof.

and similarly for *thereby*, which can still be heard:

(42) We thereby/*thenby demonstrated...

More pointedly, perhaps, deictic *there* preceding an overt noun has no *then* counterpart:

(43) That there/*then car ain't no good.

A statement touching on all the facts of this section is:

(44) Locatives are closer to deictics than are temporals.

More specifically, locatives can be formed by combining a deictic with silent PLACE, yielding what I have been calling locative *there* (or *here*). This in effect gives locatives the possibility of being phonetically indistinguishable from the non-locative deictic *there* seen in (39), (41), (42) and probably in one reading of (43).

The idea behind (44) is that the proper analysis of *then* in sentences like:

(45) They were happy (back) then.

cannot be as simple as the proper analysis of locative *there*. Put another way, although locative *there* is deictic *there* combined with PLACE, temporal *then* cannot simply correspond to a deictic element combined with TIME. This property of temporals is probably not to be understood in terms of silent TIME being systematically unavailable, given the double possibility indicated in:

(46) We'll be at your place in two hours.

(47) We'll be at your place in two hours' time.

which makes TIME seems appropriate for (46) - see Kayne (2006a).

It may rather be that silent TIME requires a modifier that is itself specified for 'time' (as is *(two) hours* in (46)), whereas PLACE is not so demanding. Alternatively put, both TIME and

PLACE require a modifier at least partially specified for, respectively, 'time' or 'place'. The difference, then, would be that there is some partial overlap between 'location' and 'deixis' itself, but no comparable partial overlap between 'time' and 'deixis'. In effect, location would then be seen as a more concrete, narrowed down (via PLACE) counterpart of deixis, whereas time would not be.

From this perspective, (45) can be thought of as:

(48) ...then TIME.

where *then* is itself specified for time - in a way that distinguishes it sharply from deictic *there*, which is not specified for location (though it can modify PLACE).

There is, consequently, no derivation available for (40) that could track the derivation of (39) (that was sketched in (12) and that is repeated here):

(49) ...[there a book]... --> raising of 'a book'
 ...a book_i ... [there t_i]... --> merger of V
 ...is a book_i ... [there t_i]... --> remnant movement
 ...[there t_i] is a book_i ... t_j...

In addition to there being no expletive *then* parallel to expletive *there*, we can also note that there is no modified expletive *there*:

(50) Are there problems with your proposal?

(51) *Are over/right there problems with your proposal?

Since expletive *there* is a subcase of deictic *there* and since deictic *there* in general disallows modification (cf. also (17)):

(52) *That over/right there car ain't no good.

the unacceptability of (51) is expected.

There is no expletive *here* parallel to expletive *there*, either:

(53) *Are here problems with your proposal?

which means that *here* cannot successfully appear in a derivation like (49). We can express this restriction as:

(54) *Here* can only appear within a definite DP.

In effect, *there* is more 'neutral' than *here*, with this difference in turn probably to be related to what I think are similar differences between *that* and *this*, e.g.:

(55) He's not all that/*this smart.

(56) The behavior of their son is somewhat different from that/*this of their daughter.

and even with what we call complementizer *that*:

(57) They think that/*this everything is fine.

One (plausible) implication of (54) is that *here* is contained within a definite DP in both of the following, despite there being no overt definite article:

(58) They live here.

(59) We hereby declare...

(In addition to some silent indicator of definiteness, (58) contains PLACE and (59) THING.)

Both locative *there* and the *there* of archaic *thereof* (and non-archaic *thereby*) have counterparts with *where*:

(60) Where do they live?

(61) Whereof have they spoken? (archaic)

(62) the plan whereby we...

Expletive *there* does not (cf. Chomsky 1995):

(63) Where is there/*where a problem?

In this respect the deictic *there* that we call expletive behaves as the deictic *there* preceding overt nouns (in non-standard English):

(64) that there car

(65) *that where car; *this where car; *a where car; *some where car

If *where* is not a deictic element at all, then (63) is not surprising.

In summary to these last sections, what we call expletive *there* is an instance of deictic *there* initially occurring within an indefinite DP, and then being split away from it, as indicated in (49).

8. Comparative syntax and existentials

In existentials, French has:

(66) Il y a un livre sur la table. ('it there has a book on the table')

with *y* an object clitic-like expletive parallel to English *there* in that *y*, like *there*, occurs elsewhere as a locative (with PLACE), as in:

(67) Jean y va. ('J there goes')

and also with THING (and a silent P), as in:

(68) Jean y pense. ('J there thinks')

Unlike English, though, French existential sentences show what seems to be a second expletive, the subject clitic *il*, as seen in (66). (Furthermore, the verb in French is 'have' rather than 'be'.)

The fact that French 'have' cooccurs in (66) with expletive *y* suggests that French (66) contains, despite appearances, a possessor subject.

The most natural interpretation of this conclusion is, I think, that the possessor subject in question in French is the subject clitic pronoun *il*. Thinking of Chomsky (1981, 325), a way to put this is to say that the *il* of (66) is a 'quasi-argument' (rather than being either an expletive or a true argument).

The status of the *il* of (66) is then significantly similar to that of the *il* of weather sentences like:

(69) Il pleut. ('it rains')

The subject *il* of French existentials shares with the *il* of French weather sentences the ability to control PRO (much as in Chomsky's discussion of English):

(70) Il pourrait y avoir du pain sans y avoir de l'eau. ('it could there to-have of-the bread without there to-have of the water')

(71) Il peut neiger sans pleuvoir. ('it can to-snow without to-rain')

Note that in the French existential control example (70) *il* does not appear in the infinitival part (it is replaced by PRO), while *y* does. This is indirectly related to the fact that English *there* cannot be a controller:

(72) There can't be a solution without *(there) being a problem.

(73) *There was a problem before being a solution.

The reason that English prohibits control with expletive *there*, in contrast to (70), is that expletive *there* (like *y*) is not a quasi-argument (but rather a deictic element that is not an argument at all).

Thus neither of the two elements that might have appeared to be expletives in French (66) is actually an expletive. The *il* is a quasi-argument, and the *y* is a deictic modifier that originates within the associate.

Note that what is in subject position in French existentials cannot, even in the absence of overt *il*, be the associate itself:

(74) *Un livre y a sur la table.

This might be due to the fact that in that derivation *un livre* is not a full DP argument, having been raised out in the first step from within the argument phrase containing *y*; alternatively, there might be an intervention/relativized minimality effect, with *y* constituting a block.

9. Other languages and no languages.

Some Scandinavian languages are like English in having existentials with *be* and with a counterpart (*der*) of subject *there*. This *der* can be taken to originate as a deictic modifier of the associate, as discussed for English. Other Scandinavian languages can have *be* with a subject (*det*) that seems more like English *it* or *that*. This *det* might be akin to French *il*, i.e. might be a quasi-argument possessor, though that would leave open (for the time being) why the verb is *be*; alternatively, this *det* might have some other status (perhaps related to the *it* of clefts) that remains to be elucidated (as does the status of various Germanic apparently expletive *its*).

In Swiss German and other southern varieties of German, existentials can have the verb *have*, with a subject *es* that corresponds in other ways to English *it* (examples from Thomas Leu):

(75) Es het es buaech uf em tisch. ('it has a book on the table')

This subject *es* looks very much like a quasi-argument counterpart of French *il*. Although in (75) there is no overt element corresponding to French *y*, Swiss German also allows:

(76) Da het s es buaech uf em tisch. ('there has it a book on the table')

with an additional *da* that may correspond to *y*. Where a Swiss German existential has *es het...* a standard German existential would have *es gibt...*, with (probably) the same *es*, but with the verb 'give'.

In Spanish and Portuguese, the verb in existentials is a form of *have*, without there being any visible counterpart of French *y* (except perhaps in the present tense in Spanish). Since Spanish and Portuguese have no visible *y* elsewhere, either, they plausibly have a silent one in existentials. In addition, they are like Catalan in having no overt counterpart of French *il*.

As we can see, there is substantial variation in the form of existentials across Romance and Germanic. This should not prevent us, however, from 'seeing' what is not present. One gap of interest can be illustrated with an (unacceptable) English example:

(77) *There has a book on the table.

Subject deictic expletive *there* is not compatible with *have* in English. But as far as I know, no Romance or Germanic language has an exact counterpart of (77), with verb 'have' and a deictic element (rather than a quasi-argument) in subject position. This follows directly from the assumption made earlier that main verb *have* requires a possessor subject, whether quasi-argument (French *il*, (Swiss) German *es*) or full argument. Combined with the radically different status of *there*, which (like French *y*) is a deictic modifier and not an argument or quasi-argument, this accounts for the general absence of (77).

10. Limitations on deictic *there* as expletive.

In (my) colloquial English, expletive *there* occurs only with *be*. Although the following are possible in some register(s) of English, they are for me impossible in colloquial English:

(78) There exist solutions to all these problems.

(79) There have arrived several letters for you.

In this respect, colloquial English is like both Italian and French, whose deictic clitic expletives *ci* and *y* are limited to existentials with *be* (in Italian) and *have* (in French) and which do not occur in the counterparts of (78) and (79). In contrast, as discussed by Burzio (1986, chap. 2), Piedmontese expletive clitic *ye* is found more widely, occurring as it does with all unaccusatives.

Why Piedmontese should be freer in this regard than Italian or French is not clear (perhaps there is a link to the fact that Piedmontese object clitics generally follow past participles in a way that Italian and French object clitics do not).

Nor is it clear why *be* is singled out by Italian, French and colloquial English - perhaps it is that *be* is associated with less structure than any other verb - or even that *be* is not really a verb (thinking of Postma (1993); cf. also Baker (2003, sect. 2.4)). Considering the partial derivation given earlier:

- (80) ...[there a book]... --> raising of 'a book'
 ...a book_i ... [there t_i]... --> merger of V
 ...is a book_i ... [there t_i]... --> remnant movement
 ...[there t_i]_j is a book_i ... t_j...

it might be that the landing site needed for the first movement step is unavailable in these languages except with *be*.

In Piedmontese, expletive *ye* does not occur with transitives, or even (Luigi Burzio, p.c.) with unaccusatives embedded under a causative. Again, it may be that the first step of (80) cannot proceed in the face of the extra structure associated with transitives.

11 Conclusion.

Expletive *there* is not an expletive in Chomsky's sense (merged directly into a sentential Spec position). It is instead an instance of deictic *there* originating within its associate.

II. Further candidates for uninterpretability

12. Reflexives.

Core minimalist question:

(81) Why does UG tolerate reflexives, with their complex syntax and often complex morphology, i.e. why do reflexives exist at all?

Given in particular that UG already has pronouns that could do the same job. Plus the fact that pronouns readily tolerate ambiguity of the sort seen in:

- (82) John thinks he's smart.
 (83) Every little boy thinks he's smart.

Reflexives do seem to reduce ambiguity in certain cases, such as:

- (84) They consider them intelligent.
 (85) They consider themselves intelligent.

But reduction in ambiguity over a limited range of cases can hardly be a satisfactory answer. After all, given the ambiguity in (82) and (83), why don't all languages simply have (84) for both the case where the antecedent of *them* is *John* and the case where it isn't?

Answer - Kayne 2002b:

- (86) a. Condition B is built deeply into UG (or perhaps follows in turn from extra-UG principles).
 b. Without reflexives, languages could therefore not express coreference between subject and local object.
 c. UG could not tolerate that loss of expressive power.

(86) has, as an answer to (81), an advantage over an ambiguity account, in that (86) is an I(nternal)-use (thought)-based account, more than an E(xternal)-use (communication)-based account. A stronger, general formulation would be:

(87) The design of the language faculty can be responsive to I-use considerations, never to E-use considerations.

The English type of reflexive transparently has complex morphology of a possessive sort (opaque in *himself*, *themselves* in standard English), as do many other languages. Is the *self* of reflexives and the corresponding noun in other languages (often *head*) interpretable?

The noun found in the possessive subtype of reflexives is, as far as I know, never *cat* or *trip* or *church* or *farm*, etc. Assume it is typically a body part - one that as part of a reflexive is idiomatically (i.e. not fully compositionally) interpreted not as a proper subpart of the person (or thing) but as equal to the whole (an arguably smaller departure from full compositionality than one would need with *cat*, etc.).

If so, then *self*, etc. is interpretable in the same sense in which nouns are interpretable in idioms like (cf. Helke 1971; 1973):

(88) They lost their head. (approx. = 'they lost control of themselves')

Romance reflexives are very often object clitics, as in French:

(89) Ils se photographient. ('they refl. photograph')

This *se* is almost certainly monomorphemic (and consonantal, with the vowel epenthetic when pronounced) and thus apparently quite different from the English type. This *se* is restricted to sentences with third person subjects, in many or most Romance languages:

(90) Je me/*se photographie. ('I me/refl. photograph')

with the ordinary non-reflexive object clitic appearing instead (*me*, here).

Yet in the Italian speaking part of Switzerland and south of that into Italy, one finds dialects in which one has:

(91) Mi a ma sa lavi i man. ('me I me refl. wash the hands')

Mi, a non-clitic, and *a*, a subject clitic of the sort discussed by Poletto (2000), are not directly relevant. Important, rather, are *ma* and *sa*, both of which seem to overtly correspond to the dative/possessive argument, where French would have just *me*:

(92) Je me (*se) lave les mains. ('I me (*refl.) wash the hands')

The proposal is:

(93) All Romance has both non-reflexive clitic and reflexive clitic together in such cases, with one or the other often not pronounced.

Why should Romance have two clitics where one would seem to suffice? Answer: Without the extra *se* or its unpronounced counterpart SE, sentences like (90) would violate Condition B just as in:

(94) *I'm photographing me.

(For the way in which an extra *self* or *se*/SE avoids this violation, see Kayne 2002b.)

Is *se*/SE interpretable? Internal to Romance, Germanic and Slavic, this *s-* seems to form a natural class with first singular *m-* and second singular *t-*. Rather than thinking of its interpretation as 'reflexive', which is probably not a primitive UG notion at all, *s-* may be closer to the *one* of *someone* (with French *on* as an intermediate step in the reasoning).

Conclusion: Neither *self* nor *s-* is uninterpretable.

13. Structural Case.

There is a familiar argument based in part on the fact that nominative seems to be compatible with a wide range of theta roles, and the same for accusative, and in part on the alternating Case pattern seen (holding the theta role constant) in *He is tall*, *We believe him to be tall*, *He is believed to be tall*, *We expect him to be believed to be tall*, etc.

This does show that nominative and accusative are theta-neutral, and that they contribute nothing to theta interpretation. From this, it does not follow, however, that they contribute nothing to interpretation.

Relevant here are French causatives, which show dativeization of the subject of the infinitive when the infinitive has a direct object (and in some other cases):

- (95) *Jean a fait Paul manger (la tarte). ('J has made/had P eat (the pie)')
- (96) Jean a fait manger Paul. ('J has made/had eat P')
- (97) *Jean a fait manger Paul la tarte.
- (98) *Jean a fait manger la tarte Paul.

As seen in these two examples, lack of *à* leads to ungrammaticality when the infinitive *manger* has a direct object *la tarte*. Rather, one has:

- (99) Jean a fait manger la tarte à Paul.

I argued in Kayne 2004b that (99) is best considered a subtype of ECM, with the twist that the infinitival subject ends up with dative rather than with accusative Case. The most natural interpretation is that this is possible because dative is a structural Case (at least here), in a way recalling in part Bittner and Hale (1996).

As with nominative and accusative in general, dative here is compatible with a wide range of theta roles, as illustrated by:

- (100) Son dernier bouquin a fait gagner beaucoup d'argent à Jean-Jacques ('his last book has made earn a-lot of money to J-J')
- (101) Tu vas faire perdre son poste à ton copain. ('you are-going to-make lose his job to your friend')
- (102) Elle fera entendre raison à Jean. ('she will-make listen-to reason to J')
- (103) Cela fera changer d'avis à Jean. ('that will-make change of opinion to J' = 'that will make J change his mind')
- (104) Ce qui est arrivé a fait perdre de l'importance au fait que Jean aime Marie. ('that which has happened has made lose (of the) importance to-the fact that J loves M')
- (105) On ne peut pas faire jouer un rôle important à tout. ('one neg can not make play a role important to everything' = 'one cannot have everything play an important role')
- (106) Elle fera effleurer le filet à la balle. ('she will-make touch the net to the ball' = 'she will make the ball touch the net')
- (107) Le coup de vent a fait traverser l'étang au petit voilier. ('the blast of wind has made cross the pond to-the little sailboat' = 'the blast of wind has made the little sailboat cross the pond')
- (108) Cela fait préférer à Jean la syntaxe à la phonologie. ('that makes prefer to J the syntax to the phonology' = 'that makes J prefer syntax to phonology')

At the same time, there is a long tradition in French syntactic work that says that this dative *à* correlates with 'affectedness'. If so (and it is especially clear if the above are compared with the causative construction using *par* ('by') in place of *à*), then structural dative Case in French causatives is contributing something to the interpretation. In which case, this *à* (and/or the *Kdat* that goes with it if I'm right in the particulars of the proposal) cannot be considered uninterpretable.

The point being, of course, that if this is correct, then it becomes more plausible that structural Case in general might be interpretable, not in the theta plane, but in the plane of notions like 'affectedness'.

14. Definite articles

When appearing with proper names, definite articles might be thought to be uninterpretable (cf. Longobardi 1994):

(109) E' arrivata la Maria. ('is arrived the M')

But the definite article here seems very much like the one that occurs in English with names of rivers:

(110) the Hudson River

for which a plausible analysis is that the definite article is essentially identical to the one in:

(111) the river named Hudson

in which case the definite article of *la Maria* could well be the same as the one in:

(112) the woman named Mary

in which case the definite article of *la Maria* could be thought of as uninterpretable only to the extent that definite articles in general are uninterpretable.

Another case of a putatively expletive definite article is in (cf. Vergnaud and Zubizarreta 1992):

(113) That ball hit him in the nose.

Alternatively, this definite article might be akin to the one found with singular generics, as suggested by:

(114) That ball hit him in the nose, which is an extremely important part of the human body. in which case *the* in (113) could be uninterpretable only to the extent that the *the* of singular definite generics is.

15. Agreement and clitic doubling.

Agreement is standardly taken to involve uninterpretable features. Non-dislocated clitic doubling of the Spanish sort is similar to agreement in some ways, and one might well be led to say that in:

(115) Yo le di un libro a la mujer. ('I her gave a book to the woman')

the pronominal clitic *le* is adding nothing to the interpretation, given the presence of the lexical DP *la mujer*.

At the same time, clitic doubling (in the third person) is, insofar as it arguably involves two occurrences of the definite article (taking Postal 1966 to be right at least about this kind of pronoun), reminiscent of determiner doubling of the sort found in Greek, where a parallel question of (un)interpretability arises.

The analysis of Greek determiner doubling proposed by Alexiadou and Wilder 1998 takes each of the definite articles in question (in Greek phrases of the 'the book the long' sort) to have its own role. They adopt a raising approach to relatives, combined with the novel idea that what raises can be a full DP containing one definite article. The other of the two seen in 'the book the long' is the one whose sister phrase is the relative CP, as in Kayne 1994. If they are on the right track, then each of the two definite articles in such phrases is every bit as interpretable as any ordinary definite article.

If clitic doubling of the sort seen in (115) is akin to Greek multiple determiners, then each definite article there (one of which looks like a pronominal clitic) will be interpretable in the same sense as the Greek ones.

First and second person clitic doubling is formally distinct from third person doubling in that the first and second person clitics don't look like definite articles at all, and is also distributionally distinct from third person doubling, as shown by the fact that Paduan non-dislocated accusative clitic doubling is possible with first and second person clitics (and reflexives - see the discussion of Romance clitics below (94)), but not with third person clitics.

Like French accusative clitic doubling, Paduan accusative clitic doubling correlates with contrastive stress on the non-clitic pronoun, and is therefore not interpretively neutral, though much remains to be understood.

Person agreement between subject and verb in Romance, at least, almost certainly involves a person morpheme following the verb only in the first and second person (nor is English *-s* a person morpheme - Kayne 1989, Postma 1993), and so may ultimately reduce to the first/second person type of clitic doubling (despite the lack of any consistently obligatory contrastive stress with subject verb agreement).

Gender agreement is found widely in Romance languages (though rarely after finite verbs, for reasons yet to be understood). Gender itself seems, when accompanying a noun, clearly to be interpretable in some cases, as Harris 1991 emphasized, e.g. Italian *ragazzo* ('boy') vs. *ragazza* ('girl'). The gender morpheme following an adjective seems not to be.

But how should we think of:

(116) That woman is a famous woman/*man.

(117) That man is a famous man/*woman/actor/*actress.

(setting aside contexts of disguise)? This seems like a form of agreement, yet one would hardly want to say that any of the nouns here are uninterpretable. Conceivably, gender agreement in general should be thought of as closer to these sentences than is usually done, with arbitrary gender (richly illustrated by Halldór yesterday - though note Ferrari's 2005 argument that Italian gender is less widely arbitrary than it seems).

Number agreement raises similar questions, in particular with respect to:

(118) My friends are your friends/*friend.

where it's again not obvious that anything here is uninterpretable.
(Case agreement will need to be addressed, too.)

Hedde Zeijlstra on Thursday had interesting examples of the following sort:

(119) You must obligatorily register.

and suggested that the modal in such examples is uninterpretable, in the spirit of agreement. An alternative might be to say that (119) is akin to:

(120) That canine is a wolf.

(121) We just bought a canine, in fact a wolf.

with *must* being to *obligatorily* as *canine* is to *wolf*, and that *canine* here is interpretable. The idea, then, is that *obligatorily* narrows down or adds to what *must* (now considered interpretable) contributes to the sentence - cf.:

(122) You must register because it's obligatory to register.

which does not feel redundant in the way of:

(123) You must register because you must register.

Whether this approach carries over to the whole range of Cinque's (1999) Spec-head pairs and to Zeijlstra's examples with negation remains to be worked out.

16. Conclusion

The existence of uninterpretable features or elements is less certain than it might seem.

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